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Temporality, space, and scale 
Paul Nugent 
The prediction that processes of globalization would inexorably lead to the 
diminished significance of international borders now seems decidedly misplaced. In 
fact, the most profound issues of our times are framed by the stubborn persistence of 
international borders in some places and their reconfiguration in others. Some of the 
issues relate to the positioning of the borders, while others concern the movement of 
people (e.g. migrants and refugees) and commodities (e.g. narcotics and pirated 
goods) through them. The process of global rebordering has been so rapid in the past 
five years that, inevitably, academic analysis is struggling to catch up. 
Whereas there is often a problem in defining the limits of an academic field, there 
is actually substantial consensus when it comes to border(land) studies. But if the field 
itself is clearly bounded, it would be difficult to identify a unified approach, far less a 
grand theory. In fact, most boundary scholars have eschewed any such agenda (Paasi 
2005: 668). Border studies straddles the core disciplines, and mediates between them, 
but it does not seek to replace them. Hence, it makes little sense to reinvent 
development economics or mobility studies in order to make sense of border flows. 
But because there are always at least two – and sometimes three – sides to any set of 
borders, they can serve as a kind of social laboratory for understanding the production 
of difference – whether with respect to governance structures, the economy, or 
cultural norms. Some of the research that is carried out in border locations is not 
explicitly positioned as border(land) studies. For those who regard themselves as 
contributing to such a defined field, much of the appeal lies in the opportunity to 
escape the tyranny of the disciplines and the confines of area studies. It also lies in 
finding common ground with researchers who have quite different regional 
specialisms. 
Because international boundaries tend to throw up cognate phenomena, they lend 
themselves to larger comparisons. For example, comparing migratory flows or small-
scale trade across the United States (US)–Mexico and South Africa–Lesotho borders 
can be extremely enlightening (Coplan 2009), even if logistical difficulties mean that 
there are relatively few comparisons of this kind. But a sensitivity to the benefits of 
comparison is hardwired into border studies scholarship. 
In order to provide a rounded account of the varied approaches to the study of 
borders across the world, it is important to take into account the different dimensions 
in which research is conducted as well as the themes that are more or less evenly 
distributed across them. Here, I will offer a broad overview, while drawing on some 
specific examples. Many of these are African, partly for the reason that this happens 
to be my own area of specialism, but also because this has been one of the undoubted 
growth areas in recent years. However, I will also have recourse to the findings of 
scholars working on Europe, Asia, and the Americas. 
Viewing borders three-dimensionally 
Border scholars grapple with very different bodies of material, which is in part a 
function of disparate disciplinary starting points. An area that used to be the preserve 
of geographers, historians, and international lawyers is now shared with political 
scientists, anthropologists, sociolinguists, and students of cultural studies. In addition, 
a field that used to be dominated by studies of the US–Mexico border and Europe has 
become much more variegated as insights distilled from other regions of the world 
have gained traction. For some, the research in question might consist of burrowing 
through administrative and legal archives in national or regional capitals, or engaging 
with policy-makers in centres of decision-making such as Brussels and Washington; 
for others, it is made up of a fine-grained analysis of dynamics in notionally remote 
fieldwork sites. 
When sources converge and corroborate each other, the researcher is lucky indeed. 
However, it is more commonly the case that materials reach the researcher in very 
different registers, highlight different phenomena, and are sometimes flatly 
contradictory. The dimension(s) that the researcher chooses to emphasize inevitably 
involve choices, and these in turn have a bearing on the shape of the data that are 
collected. 
However, one advantage that border scholars can exploit is that they are able to 
mine perspectives from either side of the line. Archives tend to offer a dual 
perspective on the same set of issues, but this is no less true of oral informants who 
interpret reality in the light of circumstances on their own side of a given boundary 
line. For the purposes of this discussion, I will focus on three dimensions and the 
disciplines to which they are generally related. 
Temporality 
As political geographers have repeatedly reminded us, the notion that there are natural 
boundaries that manifest themselves in the contours of state borders is deeply 
problematic. Borders are the work of human decisions rather than Mother Nature, and 
to that extent are the product both of grand design and messy compromise. For 
historians, the meaningful questions are why borders have emerged in particular 
places, according to which logics, and with what consequences. 
In Europe, boundary-making and state formation have generally been treated as 
closely related historical processes, in which contested frontier zones have sedimented 
as international boundaries – as in the case, for example, of France and Spain in the 
Pyrenees (Sahlins 1989). Europe also provides striking examples of the manner in 
which warfare – and even more often peace-making – has led to the abrupt 
repositioning of established borders, as happened in Europe and Africa after both 
world wars. These realities should lead one to be sceptical of the notion that borders 
emerged organically in the Old World context, whereas in the colonies they were 
externally driven. 
Although some colonial borders were the consequence of international agreements 
made in distant European capitals, they also tended to slip into the grooves created by 
pre-colonial frontier zones (Nugent 2019 [forthcoming]). Although Africa has 
commonly been regarded as the continent afflicted by the most ‘artificial boundaries’, 
there is now an accumulating body of research that indicates that there was no 
colonial ‘big bang’ moment and that pre-existing spatial logics exercised a decisive 
influence (Nugent 2019 [forthcoming]; McGregor 2009). 
The question of temporality is no less important for understanding the 
reconfiguration of borders after 1945. The implosion of European empires, and the 
closely associated outbreak of the Cold War, led to the emergence of new and often 
rather hard borders in Asia: most notably between North and South Korea and 
between India and Pakistan. In Europe itself, the disastrous record of conflict in the 
twentieth century was part of what motivated the push toward continental integration, 
in which the erasure of divisive borders and the ending of zero-sum politics was an 
explicit objective. With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, the borders of Eastern and Central Europe were reconfigured in a manner that 
turned back the clock. Equally, the implosion of post-1919 borders in the Middle East 
is a further indication that, nearly a century later, history refuses to lie down. 
Space 
The study of international borders is very obviously about the making and remaking 
of space. The often imperfect relationship between cartographic representation and 
the realities on the ground has been of particular interest to historical geographers. 
Whether contemporary satellite imagery is any more conducive to establishing 
objective truths is a moot point because they are partial representations in their own 
right. 
The demarcation of an international border necessarily creates its own dynamic 
because it creates sites where one regime of governance notionally ends and another 
begins. Whereas border/boundary studies concerns that which takes place at the line 
of separation, borderland studies is concerned with what unfolds in zones of 
engagement located on either side of a given line. These can evidently extend well 
beyond the physical border. 
On the basis that borders are a state effect, there has been a growing tendency, 
especially among anthropologists, to focus upon ‘bordering’ processes located further 
still from the borderline. This would include international airports, seaports, and 
remote locations identified as migrant/refugee processing centres. Islands present their 
own unique challenges in that the entire coastline typically represents a physical 
border – albeit one that does not need to be physically demarcated. 
Scale 
Since the 1990s, there has been a movement within critical geography to question a 
tidy conception of the world as a series of nested Russian dolls, often expressed as the 
international, the national, the regional, and the local. A vast literature on 
‘assemblages’ seeks to understand how, at a given moment, norms with very different 
scalar origins may come into contact (Allen and Cochrane 2010). 
If the scales are really so interwoven, some scholars have raised the question of 
whether it is meaningful to think in terms of scales at all. However, this risks 
throwing the baby out with the bathwater given that bureaucracies, for example, are 
evidently arranged in a scalar fashion. The alternative is to take scales as a starting 
point and then to explore the manner in which they play off each other – as Brenner 
(2004) has proposed in relation to urban policy in Europe. 
However, it is important to add that the scales relating to governance do not 
necessarily map onto those that are associated with, for instance, trade or religion. 
Coming from a rather different angle, a recent trend in anthropological research has 
tended to treat the lowest scales as constitutive of administrative practice. The idea is 
that what happens on the ground, in everyday interactions, is every bit as decisive as 
decision-making conducted at a national or international level (Bierschenk and Olivier 
de Sardan 2014). This is an insight that need not stop with officials, because what any 
border means is bound up with daily practices of moving through border spaces. 
Whether crossings are mundane or unusual, relaxed or fraught, has a crucial bearing 
on the manner in which the lines of division are internalized by border populations 
themselves. 
Themes 
International organization, regional integration, and cross-border cooperation 
After 1945, there was a proliferation of international organizations pushing for the 
introduction of common norms and standards governing the global community. Some 
of these have had a very direct bearing on borders as sites of governance: the most 
obvious examples are the World Customs Organization (WCO), the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), and the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR). In addition, states have come to their own bilateral and 
multilateral agreements designed to facilitate the management of border flows. The 
North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), which binds Canada, the United States, 
and Mexico, is perhaps the best-known example of a limited attempt to facilitate trade 
across state borders. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), founded 
in 1967, was intended to promote interstate cooperation across a wider front. The 
various regional economic communities (RECs) that have proliferated in Africa have 
followed a similar template, although this has included the right of military 
intervention. 
The European Union (EU), by contrast with NAFTA, has been far more ambitious 
in pushing for integration across the board, including the introduction of a common 
currency and the shared Schengen immigration regime (albeit with some country opt-
outs). In Africa, hybrid forms have emerged: while some RECs like the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have actively promoted freedom of 
movement and progress toward a common currency, others have focused more on 
trade harmonization. The African Union (AU) itself envisages continental integration 
somewhat along the lines of the EU model. The relationship between the RECs and 
the AU is not always an easy one because of the sometimes competing priorities. The 
picture is further complicated by virtue of the fact that a number of the RECs have 
overlapping memberships. 
The question of who has the right to initiate cooperation across state borders is a 
delicate one. In Europe, much of the impetus has come from below, with the often 
grudging acceptance of member states, as associations of border regions and 
metropolitan areas have secured EU funding to support their own agendas – a classic 
instance of assemblages at work. Meanwhile, in Africa, there are very few cross-
border initiatives from below that are officially sanctioned, precisely because 
governments have been so jealous of their sovereignty. Paradoxically, the African 
Union Border Programme (AUBP) has made border demarcation its priority, whereas 
RECs have shown greater interest in promoting practical forms of cooperation. But 
the latter has been based on the expectation that states should take the lead, bringing 
in border populations only as and when deemed necessary. 
Be that as it may, anthropological research has shed light on what is sometimes 
described as cooperation from below. The focus here is on the ways in which border 
populations have cut their own deals and established their own mechanisms for 
managing the resources arising from the existence of the border. This has included 
dealing with cross-border crime such as cattle rustling, taxing trade, regulating 
transport, and controlling access to land. A less state-centric approach reveals a more 
complex set of cross-border engagements than might at first meet the eye. 
The environmental consequences of boundary-making have created some 
incentives for cross-border cooperation at the interstate level. Because so many 
international boundaries follow watercourses, water management is inherently 
contentious – and especially so in areas of unstable rainfall. The virtual drying up of 
the Rio Grande (US–Mexico border) and of the River Jordan (Israel–Jordan border), 
partly by virtue of the diversion of water flows, provides a salutary reminder of what 
can happen when states compete. Cooperation in the management of shared water 
resources has featured prominently, for example, in West Africa: such as in the shape 
of the Senegal River Basin Development Organization (Organisation pour la Mise en 
Valeur du fleuve Sénégal, OMVS) and the Gambia River Basin Development 
Organization (Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du fleuve Gambie, OMVG). 
Waste management has also provided some of the impetus for neighbouring cities on 
the US–Mexico border to work together even when the national governments have not 
seen eye to eye. In Southern Africa, a recent development has been the proliferation 
of transfrontier parks in which the objective is to reconcile the expansion of cross-
border tourism with more effective conservation. 
A body of literature on ‘the everyday state’ or ‘states at work’ focuses on how 
officials working within customs, immigration, and other state agencies interpret 
directives and fashion their own norms at the border. The mismatch between the 
international agreements on the freedom of movement of people and goods and the 
realities on the ground can often be very stark indeed. 
In West and East Africa, coalitions of interested parties that campaign for more 
open borders have compiled detailed data on border delays, the payment of bribes, 
and the number of legal and illegal checkpoints per kilometre, both at the border and 
along the main transport corridors. Their findings underline the need for borders 
research to take the lower scales seriously when considering the practical realities of 
border governance. 
Agreements signed in Brussels and Abuja might signal a desire by policy-makers 
to render border management less intrusive, but these count for little unless they are 
actually given practical effect at the border. Where state officials feel that they are left 
out, or that they are located at the sharp end of governance reforms, cross-border 
cooperation is likely to stall. 
Security 
Security is an issue that has become one of the most important foci of borders 
research over the past decade, reflecting the ways in which governments across the 
world have responded to an accumulation of perceived threats. First of all, wealthier 
states have asserted the need to exert tighter control over what passes through their 
borders because of the potentially harmful consequences thereof. The key perceived 
threats are narcotics and weapons. The US–Mexico border has become one of the 
battlegrounds between rival drug cartels and the state agencies operating on either 
side of the border (Payan 2006). Over the past decade, much of the Colombian drug 
trade destined for Europe has been rerouted through West Africa. But as pressure 
upon Guinea-Bissau has intensified and border enforcement in Nigeria has become 
more effective, the trade has shifted to The Gambia and Ghana, respectively. 
Increasingly, the imagined threat to security includes people on the principle that 
migrants and refugees threaten the lifestyles of the wealthier countries – for example 
by placing pressure on overstretched health services or increasingly on the suspicion 
that they might harbour terrorist intentions. This has provided part of the rationale for 
Israel’s attempts to create an almost impermeable border with the Palestinian 
settlements. It has also been the justification for President Donald Trump’s attempts 
to bar entry to the US from targeted Muslim countries. 
Along the US–Mexico and the Spain–Morocco borders, fences and sophisticated 
surveillance equipment have been used to exclude access. Fences and walls are blunt 
instruments, and migrants have tended to find their way both around and under them. 
Governments have therefore invested heavily in new technologies of surveillance. 
The EU has also engaged in a strategy of displacement by pushing the frontier of 
control well beyond its own physical borders – as the role of the European Border and 
Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX) in Africa illustrates. 
In Africa itself, there is an unresolved tension between a desire to facilitate 
freedom of movement and to exercise better surveillance in order to forestall terrorist 
attacks by organizations like Al-Shabaab. In Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia, 
military insurgencies have found a fertile breeding ground in the borderlands where 
the control of the central authority is often weak. The manner in which the Islamic 
State was able to gain control of large swathes of Syria and Iraq has provided an 
inspiration for movements such as Boko Haram on the border between Nigeria, 
Cameroon, and Chad. A growth industry within political science and anthropology 
alike is the study of conflict dynamics in border zones. A more specialist concern 
within border studies concerns the technologies of border surveillance, which ranges 
from the routine use of biometric data at the border to the use of drones. 
Borders and self-determination 
There has been a resurgence of secessionist movements, stretching from Scotland and 
Catalonia in Europe, to western Zambia and coastal Kenya in Africa. Although many 
of these movements are committed to peaceful means, some defend the right to resort 
to arms as a last resort. In Africa, the particular manner in which South Sudan 
achieved its independence – that is, through a referendum won through the blood of 
thousands – seems to impart a clear lesson that sound arguments alone count for little. 
International legal experts and national governments debate the basis on which any 
group of people can claim a legitimate right to self-determination. In Europe, for 
example, the Spanish authorities insist that there is no constitutional basis for 
permitting a referendum in Catalonia. Meanwhile, the insistence of the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU) on the intangibility of inherited colonial boundaries in a 
couple of resolutions in 1963/64 is widely considered to have blocked the redrawing 
of the map of Africa after independence. 
But secessionist movements learn from each other and exploit precedents that will 
advance their cause. South Sudan has created a precedent in Africa in the manner that 
Scotland might well have done in Europe. Needless to say, the creation of breakaway 
states inevitably means the introduction of new sets of borders and associated 
controls. 
Border disputes 
Although many of the world’s borders are not considered contentious, there are some 
that are hotly disputed between states: such as Kashmir between Pakistan and India, 
or Badme between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In some of these cases, there have been 
violent conflicts at the border, followed by periods of relative peace when the border 
typically becomes a relatively hard one. An extreme case is the border between North 
and South Korea, which appears to have ossified. 
For anthropologists, the interest lies in the institutionalization of abnormality, 
whereas political scientists tend to be more interested in the reasons why disputes lie 
dormant for long periods of time before flaring up. Much of the answer lies in the 
manner in which alliances are made and unravel within the borderlands. In other 
cases, such as the dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon over Bakassi, or between 
Mali and Burkina Faso, the cases have been decided by the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ). The discovery of oil across much of Africa over the past decade has led 
to a proliferation of new disputes, which is likely to increase the load of the ICJ in the 
years ahead. 
(Im)mobilities 
There is a formidably large body of literature concerned with the passage of migrants 
and refugees across international borders. The attempt by governments to draw a 
sharp distinction between these two categories has largely broken down at the external 
borders of the EU, where the flows of large masses of people on the move – escaping 
violent conflict, avoiding political repression, or simply seeking a better life – have 
merged into one another. The desire of EU member states to prevent the influx has led 
to the unprecedented decision by member states to erect border walls, the most 
controversial instance being the decision of the Hungarian authorities to construct a 
175-kilometre fence along the border with Serbia. 
Britain’s vote to (Br)exit the EU in 2016 was driven in part by a popular belief that 
the country would be better placed to defend its borders against a migrant influx if it 
was located outside Europe – although this presumes that the French authorities 
would be inclined to cooperate from their side of the Channel. Scholarship in the 
future will no doubt be forced to consider whether the migrant crisis has served to 
unravel the pan-European project. 
In a world that is more unequal than ever, borders have been used to build better 
synergies on the inside and more rigid controls at the margins. This has been 
especially true of the US and the EU. Finding a way through the cordon has created a 
premium associated with human trafficking in all of the regions where hard borders 
represent an attempt to perpetuate marked inequalities. 
The border crossing often comes at an enormous human cost – as is exemplified by 
the thousands of deaths of Africans seeking to cross the Mediterranean each year. 
Although the borders between the US and Mexico, and between the EU and its 
neighbours, have attracted the greatest attention, a substantial body of work points to 
the existence of flows of people within the developing world. South Africa, for 
example, has been a focus for millions of migrants drawn from across the continent – 
even as it has ended the systematic recruitment of labour for the gold mines of the 
Witwatersrand from countries such as Lesotho. 
Historically, borders have been operationalized as cordons sanitaires to prevent the 
transmission of human and animal diseases. Restrictions on the movement of cattle 
across the colonial border between Kenya and Uganda, for example, were designed to 
prevent the spread of sleeping sickness. More recently, the outbreak of the Ebola virus 
in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea has led to the closure of land borders in West 
Africa and to more stringent surveillance at ports of entry across the world. 
Most countries have also adopted strict controls on the movement of meat products 
and plant materials across international borders. In a country such as Australia, this 
particular aspect of border policing is taken extremely seriously. 
Trade and transportation 
The question of scale assumes a particular significance in relation to issues of trade. 
Signatories to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the WCO are formally 
committed to removing discriminatory tariffs and applying a single set of customs 
values. In addition, economic communities generally seek to remove internal tariff 
barriers in order to promote trade between signatories. 
These conventions are generally intended to cater to the needs of large economic 
players, and take little account of the dynamics of small-scale trade. Across Africa, 
these initiatives have been pursued in tandem with ambitious infrastructural 
investments in port facilities, roads, and one-stop border posts. There are also active 
plans for the creation of integrated border management systems that will enable 
customs and immigration authorities in neighbouring countries to share information. 
But across much of the world, borders are also the locations where small-scale 
trade accounts for substantial proportions of the overall flow – much of it in the shape 
of contraband. In Africa, official statistics on regional trade have consistently 
underestimated the total volume of regional trade. The gendered nature of this trade 
has a particular bearing on the relationship between trade and livelihoods. 
Urbanism 
One of the many effects of boundaries across the world is the flourishing of urban 
settlements that feed off border dynamics. The twin towns of the US–Mexico border, 
in which the larger sibling is usually found on the Mexican side of the line, is well-
documented. Trade and the possibility of migration are what attract people to the 
Mexican ‘trampoline towns’. 
In Africa, a disproportionate number of capital cities are located either on, or close 
to, an international border. The cities of Kinshasa and Brazzaville, which are home to 
some 11 million people, provide the world’s only case where capitals face each other 
across a border. 
Although border towns have generally not grown faster than the national average, 
hubs within regional trading networks have often experienced the most prolific 
expansion of all (Soi and Nugent 2017). In such urban locations, the livelihoods of 
large numbers of people are bound up with the dynamics of cross-border trade. 
In the EU, some of the most important showcases for cross-border cooperation 
have involved the formal twinning of border towns. Even where formal arrangements 
do not exist, it has become common practice for people to work in one city (e.g. 
Geneva) and live in another – often taking advantage of national differences in pay 
scales and national/municipal taxation. 
Border cultures 
Whereas much of the social science literature is concerned with processes of 
regulation, there is a substantial anthropological corpus that grapples with two other 
questions: namely the difference the existence of a border makes to the everyday lives 
of ‘borderlanders’, and how far a border culture itself could be said to emerge within 
these exceptional spaces. 
The vast literature on the US–Mexico border has explored the complex relationship 
between Mexican populations on two sides of the line, in which commonality and 
difference are simultaneously produced. An emergent body of work on African 
borderlands is coming to comparable conclusions about the double-edged effects that 
borders create. 
The debate about the conditions under which distinct border cultures arise has yet 
to produce a clear-cut set of answers. However, there is an emergent strand on cross-
border festivals that points to the ways in which actors seek to mediate the differences 
that national processes have tended to instil, including language, food and drink, 
music, literature, and dress. The difficulty for actors has resided in the desire to 
reconcile the elements that are held in common with an acceptance of the reality that 
the influences emanating from the national centres have created genuine differences. 
On the interface between francophone and anglophone states in West Africa, 
something as simple as bread – baguettes versus sweetened bread – point to the 
manner in which borders serve to engender difference. In the everyday, researchers 
can point to some of the ways in which macro- and micro-level processes are 
interwoven. 
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